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Abstract 
What are the consequences of resource-based regional specialization, when it persists over a long 
period of time? While much of the literature argues that specialization is beneficial, recent work 
suggests it may be costly in the long run, due to economic or political reasons. I examine this question 
empirically, using exogenous geological variation in the location of subsurface oil in the Southern 
United States. I find that oil abundant counties are highly specialized: for many decades their mining 
sector was almost as large as their entire manufacturing sector. During the 1940s and 1950s, oil 
abundant counties enjoyed per capita income that was 20-30 percent higher than other nearby 
counties, and their workforce was better educated. But whereas in 1940 oil production crowded out 
agriculture, over the next 50 years it caused the oil abundant counties to develop a smaller 
manufacturing sector. This led to slower accumulation of human capital in the oil abundant counties, 
and to a narrowing of per capita income differentials to about 5 percentage points. Despite this caveat, 
the gains from specialization were large, and specialization had little impact on the fraction of total 
income spent by local government or on income inequality. 
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1 Introduction
Regional specialization is a widespread phenomenon (Krugman 1991; Kim 1995; Ellison
and Glaeser 1999; and Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999), and in many cases a single
industry has accounted for a large share of regional employment over many decades. Exam-
ples of specialization are numerous: steel manufacture in Pennsylvania, wine production in
areas of France, and coﬀee growing in parts of Central Africa. Yet despite the prevalence of
regional specialization, we have relatively little evidence about its long-term consequences.
In this paper I analyze the consequences of specialization in oil production in parts
of the Southern US from 1940-1990. The growth of the South over the 20th century is of
inherent interest (e.g Wright 1986 and Caselli and Coleman 2001), and this paper sheds light
on the role of oil abundance in this process. Moreover, this setting allows us to examine
specialization brought about by resource abundance, which is a common phenomenon in
developing economies.
Regional specialization allows economies to benefit from their resource endowments, ac-
cording to both neoclassical and new models of trade. However, much research suggests
that specialization, which relies on natural resources, may have adverse consequences (e.g.
Corden and Neary 1982). Taking a long-run perspective, Matsuyama (1992) analyzes an
open-economy, two-sector model, where better farmland leads an economy to specialize in
agriculture, diverting labor from manufacturing and slowing down learning-by-doing and
growth.1
In addition to these purely economic channels, recent work argues that resource abun-
dance may also aﬀect growth adversely through political economy processes. For example,
resource abundance may make institutions worse by inducing severe inequality (Engerman
and Sokoloﬀ 1997), incentives for increased spending (Tornell and Lane 1999), or power
struggles (Caselli 2006).
1A diﬀerent mechanism through which factor endowments can aﬀect human capital accumulation is
discussed in Schott (1998) and Leamer et al. (1999).
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In absence of a clear theoretical prediction regarding the net eﬀect of regional special-
ization in the long run, this question has been examined empirically. For example, Wright
(1990) finds that the US leveraged its natural resources intensively during a period of rapid
growth from 1880-1920. But Sachs and Warner (2001) find evidence that countries exporting
natural resources experienced significantly lower growth rates in recent decades. Moreover,
cross-country evidence, although suggestive, typically suﬀers from omitted variables and
measurement error problems, so it do not likely identify the causal eﬀects of resource-driven
specialization.
In order to estimate the consequences of regional specialization, we would like to com-
pare a set of economies that specialize in a particular goods due to comparative advantage,
to economies that are similar in other respects. Much of the empirical analysis of special-
ization uses variation across countries and over time (e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg 2003). To
better control for confounding factors, recent work examines the eﬀect of demand shocks
on specialized regions within a country (e.g. Black, McKinnish, and Sanders 2005; Buckley
2003; and Angrist and Kugler 2005). My work builds on this line of research, but I examine
long-term outcomes, rather than short-run eﬀects of changes in demand. Moreover, I use a
new source of exogenous variation: the location of geologically defined oilfields.2
The geological data I use shows how much oil was taken out of large US oilfields by 1999,
and how much oil had not yet been extracted at that time. The hazard rate of discovery
of major inland oilfields in the US has declined in recent decades and it is now very low,
so we can reasonably assume that we have a close approximation to the exogenous natural
variation in oil endowment.
In order to analyze the eﬀects of oil abundance I use county-level data, derived mostly
from US Census data, which spans many decades. To ensure that the control counties are
similar to the oil abundant counties in other respects, I focus on a region in the South,
which includes more than two-thirds of the oil abundant counties in the US. At the same
2The location of natural gas is correlated with the location of oil, and an oil field may produce substantial
amounts of gas. Throughout the paper "oil" stands for both oil and natural gas.
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time, counties adjacent to oil abundant ones may be aﬀected directly by oil (e.g. through
commuting), and the empirical analysis is robust to excluding them from the sample. An-
other advantage of this setting is that the extent of institutional variation in the region is
low compared to cross-country settings, so it is less likely that resource endowments are
spuriously correlated with variations in institutional quality. Reassuringly, I find that the
control counties were similar to the oil abundant counties in terms of industrialization and
manufacturing wages in 1890, before the discovery of major oilfields in this region.
The county-level data provide a rich source of potential outcomes, so to guide my empiri-
cal investigation I develop a neoclassical model of regional specialization. This model diﬀers
from most of the existing literature in two important ways. First, I analyze specialization
in a good that is not inherently "worse" than other goods, so this analysis is applicable to a
wide range of products. Second, the model does not rely on endogenous institutional change
or on learning by doing, so it can be applied to diﬀerent regions of developed economies with
strong institutions and costless transfer of technology.
The model considers two economies, which diﬀer only in their cost of producing a certain
specialized tradable good, such as oil. One economy, which has an advantage in producing
that good, initially trades it in exchange for a bundle of traditional goods (e.g. agricultural
goods). Over time, technological change introduces new goods (e.g. manufacturing goods),
and I assume that human capital is more productive in those goods more than in the tradi-
tional goods. I also assume that the demand share of the specialized good remains constant,
reflecting an ongoing importance of the specialized good, and that the new goods may be
produced using the same technology in both economies. In this setting, production of new
goods takes place disproportionately more in the non-specialized economy. If workers en-
dogenously invest in human capital, the specialized economy may accumulate human capital
more slowly and grow at a slower rate.
Taking the predictions of the model to the data, I find that oil-abundance raised employ-
ment in the mining sector from about 1-2 percentage points to about 6-8 percentage points
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throughout the period 1940-1990.3 In fact, in oil abundant counties, employment in mining
was equal to about 50-110 percent of employment in manufacturing, reflecting the highly
specialized nature of these counties. Moreover, the employment in mining understates the
importance of the oil sector in the oil abundant economies, since many people were employed
in service and manufacturing industries related to oil extraction.
Since oil is a skill-intensive commodity, and in 1940 the region I consider was largely
agricultural, the oil abundant counties had similar employment share of manufacturing and
a higher stock of educated workers in 1940. I find that oil-abundance had a large eﬀect on
income in 1949, raising median family income by about 30 percentage points.4
Considering the eﬀect of oil-abundance on industry structure, I find that from 1940-
1990 oil production gradually crowded out manufacturing, rather than agriculture, thereby
slowing down the process of industrialization. To further understand the impact of oil
abundance on industrialization, I examine the diﬀerential eﬀect of right-to-work laws on oil-
abundant counties. Consistent with Holmes (1998), I find that right-to-work laws increased
the employment share of manufacturing in most counties; however, I find some evidence that
in oil-abundant counties, right-to-work laws had no significant eﬀect on the employment share
of manufacturing.
As the oil abundant counties developed relatively smaller manufacturing and service
sectors, they also accumulated human capital more slowly. On average, the fraction of
people who had (at least) graduated from high-school increased at a rate that was about
0.8-1 percentage points lower per decade from 1940-1990. In fact, there is some evidence that
in 1990 the oil abundant counties had a lower share of people with high-school education
or more. The reversal in human capital accumulation is interesting, since it diﬀers from a
simple convergence result. This finding is also interesting in light of the high skill intensity
3Throughout this paper I use mining as the set of industries that includes extraction of oil and gas. In
the region I analyze oil and gas extraction are the primary mining industry.
4Data on median family income are available since 1949; data on income per capita, which are available
from 1959, give a results that are very similar to the results using median family income. I also find that oil
abundance led to an increase in population. Michaels and Redding (2006) discuss in detail the eﬀects of oil
abundance on the growth rates of cities of diﬀerent sizes.
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of the oil sector itself, and the fact that the oil abundant counties had higher per capita
public expenditure (overall and on education), reflecting their higher per capita income.
Importantly, I also find that the oil abundant counties grew at a slower rate from 1940-
1990, and by 1990 their per capita income was only about 5-6 percentage points higher than
the other counties in their region. I show that this result is not driven entirely by convergence;
rather, it is due at least in part, to the eﬀects of oil on industry composition and human
capital accumulation. But despite the relative decline of the oil abundant counties there is
no evidence of adverse eﬀects of oil abundance on income inequality. In fact, in 1990 the
distribution of family income in the oil abundant counties first-order stochastically dominates
that of the control counties.
My main findings on the eﬀects of oil-abundance are statisically significant, even after
controlling for geographic and demographic covariates and state-year interactions. I find
further support for these results using an orthogonal source of variation in the extent of
specialization in the production of oil: a comparison of oil abundant counties with diﬀerent
levels of oil endowment reveals that oil initially crowds out agriculture, and that the most
oil abundant counties are initially better educated and richer; over time, these diﬀerences
decreased significantly.
Taken together, the evidence in this paper indicates that the long-term consequences of
regional specialization in oil production were generally favorable. The oil abundant counties
enjoyed higher per capita income than the control counties for many decades. Moreover, there
is no indication of adverse eﬀects on the income distribution, or of disproportional public
spending. However, this paper also suggests that specialization in oil slowed industrialization
and human capital accumulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the
long term eﬀects of regional specialization. Section 3 discusses the data and the samples I
use. Section 4 presents an empirical analysis using data from an oil-producing region in the
Southern US, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 A Model of Regional Specialization
In order to frame the empirical analysis of the eﬀects of regional specialization, this section
presents a simple theoretical framework, based on Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977).
Previous work (Matsuyama 1992) finds that specialization in goods that generate no learning-
by-doing can have long term costs. I show that there are interesting long-term implications
for specialization even when the specialized good is in no sense "worse" than other goods, and
when technology transfers are costless. The main intuition of the model can be summarized
as follows: assume that one economy has an advantage in producing a certain set of goods, so
it specializes in their production. Initially, the specialized goods crowd out traditional goods,
but over time exogenous skill-biased technological change introduces new goods, which are
more skill-intensive. Production of these new goods takes place disproportionately less in the
economy that produces the specialized good, aﬀecting its endoegnous investment in human
capital and its growth rate.
I begin by considering an economy ("home"), where perfectly competitive firms use labor
to produce a continuum of goods of measure 1. This economy has a continuum of workers
of measure L, and each worker can invest in human capital, which increases the number of
units of labor she can supply. The continuum of goods can be divided into three types: a
measure z of specialized goods (e.g. oil), a measure x1 of traditional goods, and a measure
x2 = 1 − z − x1 of new goods. A worker with education e supplies ehs units of labor in
the production of the specialized goods, e units of labor in the production of the traditional
goods, and eh units of labor in the production of the new goods. To reflect the higher skill-
intensity of new goods relative to traditional goods I assume that h > 1.5 For simplicity, I
assume that hs ∈ [1, h], so the skill requirements in production of the specialized good are
not lower than in the traditional goods, but not higher than in the new goods. However,
the results below hold when hs ∈ (1− ε, h+ ε), for some ε > 0. In other words, the results
5Using US manufacturing data for the late 1970s and the 1980s, Xiang (2005) finds that new goods’
average skilled-labor intensity exceeds the old goods’ by over 40%. For a diﬀerent discussion of new goods
and increased demand for skill see also Xiang (2006).
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require that the skill-intensity in the production of the specialized good is similar to that of
the other goods.
When considering the cost of investment in education, I assume that it is proportional
to the wage rate and convex in the level of investment, so:
c (e) =
1
2
e2w. (1)
Individuals must choose their level of investment in education before they are assigned to
an industry. Since all individuals are identical, I assume that they are randomly assigned to
the diﬀerent industries.6
Having discussed the conditions in the home economy, we can consider another ("foreign")
economy, which I shall denoted with an asterisk. The foreign economy is identical to the
home economy, except that it has a disadvantage in the production of the specialized good.
For simplicity assume that the specialized good can only be produced in the home economy.
The workers in both economies spend their wage income on consumption goods. I as-
sume that they have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences, so income eﬀects play no role in
determining the patterns of trade:
U =
Z 1
0
b(z) ln d(z)dz, (2)
where d(z) is the quantity of good z consumed, and
Z 1
0
b(z)dz = 1. (3)
I assume that a constant share of total income, B =
Z z
0
b(z)dz, is spent on the specialized
6This is a simplifying assumption that allows me to work with a single factor of production in each
economy, facilitating the derivation of simple analytic solutions. It captures the fact that students have
some uncertainty regarding their industry of employment, and that there is high persistence of employment
across industies.
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good, and the remainder of the income is spent on the other types of goods.7 I also assume
that there are transportation costs of an iceberg form, so a fraction g (z) of each unit of z
shipped from one economy to the other arrives at its destination. The traditional goods and
the new goods can be ranked in a strictly decreasing order of shipping cost, so g0 (z) > 0,
and I assume that both types of goods have the same distribution of trade costs. Having
outlined the assumptions of the model, we can now characterize its main predictions.
2.1 Open Economy Equilibrium
The open economy equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions. First, there is a
unique threshold good z, such that consumers in the home economy face the same price for
an imported good and a domestically produced good:
ω ≡ w
w∗
=
1
g (z)
. (4)
Second, home exports the goods [0, z] and imports the goods [z, 1], while the goods (z, z)
are not traded in equilibrium. Trade is balanced, so the value of imports to the home
economy equals the value of its exports:
wLS
1Z
z
b (z) dz = w∗L∗S∗
zZ
0
b (z) dz ⇔ ω
µ
L∗S∗
BLS
¶
= 1/
1Z
z
b (z) dz, (5)
where S and S∗ are the average number of units of labor supplied by a worker in the home
and foreign economies.
In equilibrium, the fraction of workers employed in production of new goods in the foreign
economy is:
P ∗ =
x2
x2 + (1−B − x2)h
, (6)
7Note that if B is not constant, but decreases to zero as new goods are introduced, the home economy
ceases to be specialized in a meaningful way.
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and the fraction of workers producing the specialized goods in the home economy is:
Ps =
B (wLS + w∗L∗S∗)h
B (wLS + w∗L∗S∗)h+ ((1−B)wLS −Bw∗L∗S∗) (x2 + (1−B − x2)h)hs
(7)
Note that this assume that home expenditure on the non-specialized good ((1−B)wLS)
are at least as big as foreign expenditures on the specialized good (Bw∗L∗S∗), so Ps ≤ 1.
Taking the employment shares and ω, z as given, workers choose their level of education,
equating marginal returns to marginal cost, so the levels of education in the foreign economy
an the home economy are:
e∗ = P ∗h+ (1− P ∗) (8)
and:
e = Pshs + (1− Ps) e∗. (9)
The measure of units of labor supplied in the two economies is therefore:
S∗ = (e∗)2 (10)
and
S = (e)2 (11)
Taking the wage in the home economy, w, as numeraire, we have 8 equations in 8 un-
knowns:
(ω, z, P ∗, Ps, e∗, e, S∗, S). The Appendix characterizes suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness
of an equilibrium, and Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this equilibrium.
We can now use the model to derive a 4 predictions regarding the diﬀerences between
the two economies, as new goods replace traditional goods.
Claim 1 When both economies produce only specialized goods and traditional goods, per
capita income is higher in the home economy, or in other words: wS > w∗S∗.
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Proof. Equation 4 shows that the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor is higher in home: ω > 1.
Intuitively, home imports goods that can be produced with the same unit labor cost at home
and incurs transport costs. Before any new goods are introduced x2 = 0. If hs = 1 then
S = S∗ = 1, so per capita income in home is ω times higher than in foreign. Since S is
continuous and increasing in hs and S∗ is constant in hs, per capita income is higher in the
home economy.
Claim 2 Production of the specialized good initially crowds out traditional goods, but over
time it increasingly crowds out new goods.
Proof. The employment share of new goods in foreign is P ∗, while in home it is only
P ∗ × (1−employment share of specialized good). This implies that when new goods are
introduced, their production takes place disproportionately more in the foreign economy.
Claim 3 The foreign economy accumulates education faster than the home economy as new
goods fully replace traditional goods.8
Proof. When there are no new goods: (e∗ − e) |x2=0 = −Ps |x2=0 (hs − 1) ≤ 0, and when
there are no traditional goods (e∗ − e) |x2=1−B = Ps |x2=1−B (h− hs) ≥ 0. Moreover, since
h > 1, at least one of those inequalities must be strict, so the foreign economy starts with a
less educated workforce and ends up with a better educated workforce. Therefore, it experi-
ences a more rapid accumulation of human capital as the new goods replace the traditional
goods.
Claim 4 The foreign economy grows at a faster than the home economy as new goods replace
the traditional goods.
Proof. Based on the results of the previous claim, S∗ |x2=0 ≤ S |x2=0 and S∗ |x2=1−B ≥
S |x2=1−B , and at least one of the inequalities is strict. Therefore, as the new goods replace
8The eﬀect of investment in education is not modelled here. If the specialized economy is richer, it may
invest more in education, reducing the cost of acquiring education. Such a supply response may oﬀset the
demand-side eﬀect outlined in the model.
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the traditional goods, S∗/S increases. Using equations 4 and 5 we conclude that ω declines,
but proportionally less than the increase in S∗/S. At the same time, z also declines, as the
range of goods imported to home increases. In other words, as the eﬀective supply of labor
increases more rapidly in the foreign economy, its terms of trade worsen, and it exports more
goods. At the same time, its wage per eﬃciency unit of labor decreases relative to the home
economy. But the net eﬀect is an increase in per capita income in the foreign economy,
compared to the home economy.
Before moving to the the empirical analysis of these predictions, we may consider some
of the simplifying assumptions of the model. First, the model assumes no migration between
the two economies. If we relax this assumption and allow frictionless migration, then all the
population migrates to the oil abundant economy, since any good can be produced there
at the same cost and there are no trade costs. To make the model more realistic, we can
assume that each economy has a local scarce consumption good, such as housing. In this
case, diﬀerences in housing cost oﬀset the diﬀerence in wages, so in equilibrium workers are
indiﬀerent between living in the two economies.9 In the empirical section of the paper I
test whether population increased more rapidly in the oil abundant economies, and whether
housing rental rates are positively correlated with oil abundance. Further implications of
endogenous migration, including its eﬀects on cities of diﬀerent sizes, are discussed at length
in Michaels and Redding (2006).
Second, the model can also be expanded to accommodate within-industry skill upgrading,
as long as it is orthogonal to the introduction of new goods. In this case, oil abundant
economies still accumulate human capital more slowly, since the oil industry increases its
demand for skill at the same rate as other industries. Third, I assume that workers do
not anticipate the changes in industry composition when making their education investment
decisions. But this is not likely a major concern when a long period of time is required for
the technological change to have a large economic impact.
9A similar set up is discussed in Michaels (2006).
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Fourth, I do not model the role of capital in the production function. But if capital flows
freely across the diﬀerent economies, the returns to capital are equated, and any diﬀerences in
capital intensity across sectors are unlikely to aﬀect the demand for skill. Finally, the model
does not account for the eﬀects of income on public education spending. For example, if the
specialized economy is richer, higher investments in human capital may oﬀset (or partially
oﬀset) the eﬀect of specialization on human capital accumulation. In the next sections I
examine the eﬀect of oil abundance on education spending.
Given these potential concerns, it is important to test the model’s predictions empirically.
In order to test these predictions we require data on a set of economies that are similar, except
for a specific source of comparative advantage, which causes some of them to specialize in a
particular set of goods over a long period of time. The next section explains how I construct
such a data set, using geological variation in the location of subsurface oil in the Southern
United States, which causes certain counties to specialize in the extraction of oil.
3 Data and Samples
This section explains the construction of the data set, which I use to examine the eﬀects of
regional specialization. The Oil and Gas Journal Data Book lists the names of US oilfields
that had at least 100 million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted from them. This
includes the amount extracted by 1999 and the amount that was projected to have remained
in the oilfield at that time. Major oilfields were first discovered in the US South after 1890
(see Figure 2). The hazard rate of discovery of new fields increased until the 1930s, and it
has since declined. In fact, only one major US oilfield was discovered during the 1990s, and
it was under sea. The oilfield data is therefore a good approximation of the exogenous oil
endowment of the diﬀerent counties.
In order to determine the location of the oilfields I use the Using the Oil and Gas Field
Code Master List, and I define a county as oil abundant if it lies above one or more of
these oilfields or part thereof. Of the 222 oil abundant counties in the US, 150 counties
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(about two-thirds) are in three adjacent states in the Southern US: Texas (107 counties),
Oklahoma (24 counties), and Louisiana (19 counties). Moreover, unlike other oil abundant
states (Alaska and California) the 3 states I consider are divided into counties in a fairly
regular way, aﬀording a good set treatment and control regions. In order to focus the analysis
on counties that are similar in terms of economic opportunities and institutions, other than
the availability of oil, I use the Geographic Information System to restrict my sample to
counties that are within 200 miles of the oil abundant counties in Texas, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana. This leaves a sample of 775 counties, 171 of which are oil abundant (see map in
Figure 3).10
In the baseline specification, I use all the nearby counties as controls for the oil abundant
counties. But in some specifications I use only counties that are nonadjacent as an alternative
control group. This creates a larger diﬀerence in terms the comparative advantage in oil
production for a number of reasons. First, workers in non-adjacent counties are less likely
to commute to work in the oil abundant counties. Second, adjacent counties are perhaps
more likely to have smaller oilfields, which are not identified in my data. Interestingly, in
1940 the employment share of the mining sector is similar in both adjacent and non-adjacent
counties. However, by 1990 these shares diverge, as mining takes up 2.7 percent of the labor
force in the adjacent counties and only 0.9 percent in the non-adjacent counties. Finally,
almost all the oil refining capacity in the sample counties is now found in the oil abundant
counties and in the adjacent counties, suggesting that very little oil refining took place in the
non-adjacent counties.11 The main drawback of using only non-adjacent counties as controls
is, that they may diﬀer from the oil abundant counties for other reasons. But in the next
section I examine these diﬀerences, and find that the non-adjacent counties are plausible
controls.
10In addition to the 150 oil-abundant counties mentioned above, 21 other oil abundant counties in Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, and New Mexico that are also included in the sample.
11Calculations based on Energy Information Administration data for 2006 suggest that about 57 percent
of refining capacity in the sample is found in the oil abundant counties, compared to about 38 percent in
the adjacent counties and about 5 percent in the other counties.
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Another potential concern is that oil revenues may aﬀect economic outcomes at the
state level. For this reason, the next sections also present specifications that contrast the
oil abundant counties in the three oil abundant states (Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana)
with counties that are not oil abundant and lie in the other nearby non-oil states. The
shortcoming of this specification is, that it may attribute to oil-abundance any state-specific
policies that are unrelated to oil. For that reason, I discuss specifications that use only
within-state variation when I consider the robustness of my findings.
Having constructed the sample of counties, I use the County Data Books to obtain county-
level data on land, population, industrial composition of employment, education, expenditure
on education, and income, for 1940-1990.12 Micro data from the 1980 census data are used
to shed more light on the eﬀect of oil-abundance on education; however, this data is more
coarsely aggregated, and identify only the county group in which each individual resides.
In addition to the data on county-level outcomes, I use also data from Rappaport and
Sachs (2003) on the distance from the geographic centroid of each county to the nearest
ocean and navigable river. Finally, I use data on states that enacted right-to-work laws and
related pro-business policies, mostly during the 1940s and 1950s (Holmes 1998, Lumsden and
Petersen 1975). Holmes shows that these laws facilitated the development of manufacturing,
and I examine if they had a diﬀerential impact on counties that are not oil abundant, where
transition from agriculture to manufacturing is predicted to have taken place more rapidly.
The dataset that I construct has several advantages for examining the consequences
of regional specialization. First, it provides a new exogenous source of variation that can
lead to specialization. This approach improves over cross-country comparisons (e.g. Sachs
and Werner 2001), that use the fraction of raw materials in exports, since total exports
may depend on technology and human capital endowment. Second, the specialized good
has to constitute a substantial fraction of demand over a long period of time. National
Income and Product Accounts show that the share of oil and gas extraction in total employee
12The data on agricultural employment from 1960 onwards includes forestry and fisheries, which are
relatively small. I use data from 1960 to impute employment in forestry and fisheries in 1940 and 1950.
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compensation was about 0.7 percent in 1948 and about 0.6 percent in 198713, and it was
a major source of income in the counties I analyze. Third, the availability of consistent
data over an extended period of time allows me to examine the transition from traditional
goods, such as agriculture, to more skill-intensive goods (e.g. manufacturing). Fourth, the
data aﬀords a large set of control economies, that are similar in terms of their economy
and technology, except for their oil-abundance. Finally, the region I analyze has fairly
homogeneous set of institutions, so any spurious correlation between resource abundance
and institutions is much less of a concern than in the case of international comparisons. Of
course, it is still possible that oil abundance leads to poor economic performance by raising
inequality or disproportinal or distorted spending. In the next section I examine whether
there is evidence for such eﬀects, in addition to testing the predictions of the model.
4 Empirical Analysis: Specialization in Oil Production
4.1 Specialization in an Agricultural Economy
In 1890 the economy of the Southern US was primarily agricultural (Wright 1986), and large
oilfields had not yet been discovered (see Figure 2). Census data for 1890 is available for most
of the sample counties, although it is not entirely consistent with subsequent decades (e.g.
due to subsequent changes in county boundaries). Nevertheless, I examine whether economic
outcomes were correlated with oil abundance as a specification check. Reassuringly, I find
that oil abundance is uncorrelated with the percentage of manufacturing employees in the
total population and with log average wage income of manufacturing workers.14
In 1940 the region I analyze was still mostly agricultural (Table 1), and mining was more
skill intensive than agriculture.15 Oil-abundance had a large impact on the local economy: in
13However, it did fluctuate over time, especially with the rise and decline of energy prices.
14A regression of the percentage of manufacturing employees in total population on an indicator for oil
abundance for the 596 counties that reported this data for 1890 gives a coeﬃcient of 0.2 with robust standard
error of 1.2. A regression of log average manufacturing wage income on an indicator for oil abundance for
527 counties yields a coeﬃcient of .005 with robust standard error of .051.
15In 1940, the fraction of employees that attained at least a high-school degree was 15 percent in mining,
compared to about 10 percent in agriculture and about 26 percent in manufacturing (Author’s tabulations
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oil abundant counties the mining sector employed 6.2 percent of the labor force, more than
the entire manufacturing sector. In contrast, the mining sector employed about 1.3 percent
of the labor force in other nearby counties.16
The model predicts that under these circumstances, oil-abundance raises per capita in-
come. Table 1 shows that in 1949, the first year for which county-level income data are
available, the median family income in oil abundant counties was about 28 percent higher
than in the other sample counties. In 1959, the first year for which I have data on per capita
income, the oil counties had an average per capita income that was about 17 percent higher
than the other counties. Regressions using the alternative specifications in Table 1 also show
that the oil abundant counties had significantly higher income around the middle of the 20th
century.
4.2 Specialization and Industrialization
In the decades following 1940 the US South underwent substantial economic changes (Wright
1986). The transition from agriculture to manufacturing and services in the counties I analyze
was very rapid: the fraction of the labor force employed in agriculture fell from about 40
percent in 1940 to about 10-15 percent in 1970. This change allows us to examine the eﬀect
of specialization in the production of oil on the transition from traditional tradable goods
(agriculture) to newer and more skill intensive tradable goods (manufacturing).
The top panel in Table 2 shows the eﬀect of oil-abundance in 1940, using the following
cross-section specification:
Yc = αdc + εc, (12)
where Yc is the county-level outcome, dc is an indicator for oil-abundance, and εc is an error
term.
In 1940 the employment share of mining was about 5 percentage points higher in oil
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series - IPUMS).
16Employment in mining includes the extraction of natural resources other than oil and gas.
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abundant counties compared to the various control groups. The employment share of agri-
culture was about 8-9 percentage points lower than in the control group, whereas there was
no significant diﬀerence in the employment share of manufacturing. Thus, in an economy
that produces (almost exclusively) traditional goods, oil crowded out traditional goods.
The bottom panel in the Table 2 show results from regressions of the form:
Yct = φc + ψt + αtdc + εct, (13)
where Yct is the outcome in county c at year t; φc and ψt are county fixed eﬀects and year
eﬀects; αt is a time-varying coeﬃcient on the indicator for oil-abundance, dc; and εct is a
residual. The employment shares of mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, which are the
outcomes of interest, are also shown in Figure 4.
As the results show, there was very little change in the employment share of mining over
time, with the exception of the temporary rise in 1980 due to the oil boom.17 However, now
the employment share of agriculture in the oil abundant counties was only about 1.5-2 per-
centage points lower than in the control group, and the employment share of manufacturing
was 4-7 percentage points higher. Thus, as the model predicts, oil increasingly crowded out
the production of more skill intensive goods.18
We can also examine if specialization in oil aﬀected the transition to manufacturing
using variation in pro-business policies across states. Holmes (1998) finds that right-to
work laws and related pro-business policies, enacted during the 1940s and 1950s, promoted
the expansion of the manufacturing sector. If specialization in the production of oil slows
down this expansion, we expect that right-to-work laws would have a larger eﬀect on the
17The discovery of new major oilfields, as shown in Figure 2, and the depletion of some existing fields may
have also aﬀected the employment share of mining over time, but in practice the net eﬀect of these changes
appears to have been relatively small.
18Results described in a later section of this paper show that population growth in the oil abundant
counties. This implies that over time land became relatively more scarce in the oil-abundant counties.
But if this eﬀect were important, we would have expected a faster transition away from agriculture in the
oil-abundant counties, whereas in practice the share of agriculture decreases more rapidly in the control
counties.
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employment share of manufacturing in states that are not oil abundant.19
In order to estimate the diﬀerential impact of right-to-work laws in oil abundant counties,
I estimate the following regression:
Ycst = φc + ψt + αtdc + βtlst + γtdclst + εcst, (14)
where Ycst is the outcome in county c, state s, at year t; φc and ψt are county fixed eﬀects and
year eﬀects; αt, βt,and γt are time-varying coeﬃcients on the indicator for oil-abundance, dc,
the indicator for a right to work law in state s at time t, lst, and the interaction of these
two terms; and εcst is a residual. The first three columns in Table 3 show estimates for the
right-to-work laws alone (αt = γt = 0), while the next three columns show the unrestricted
estimates.
The results show that right-to work laws did indeed expand manufacturing. Moreover,
Table 3 shows that the eﬀect of the laws was larger in counties that were not oil abundant,
but in oil abundant counties right-to-work laws had no significant eﬀect on manufacturing
employment.
These results suggest that oil-abundance led counties to specialize in the production of oil,
initially crowding out agriculture, and later on crowding out more skill-intensive industries.
The next section examines the eﬀect of oil-abundance on human capital directly, by looking
at the eﬀect of oil-abundance on the stock of educated workers.
4.3 Specialization and Accumulation of Education
The model outlined above predicts that by increasingly crowding out the production of new
goods, specialization slows down the rate of accumulation of education. In order to examine
this prediction, I consider the fraction of people who had a high-school degree (or more)
among people 25 years and older. As the top panel in Table 4 shows, oil abundant counties
19In the sample of counties I use, the states that did not enact right-to-work laws are New-Mexico,
Colorado, Oklahoma, and Missouri.
18
had a better educated workforce in 1940, with about 2-3 percentage points more high-school
graduates than the control counties.20
Over the next 50 years, the fraction of high-school graduates increased at rapid rates in
the region I analyze, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 4. In the oil abundant counties the
rate of accumulation of education was significantly slower, by about 0.8-1 percentage point
per decade. Moreover, in two of the three specifications, the workforce in the oil abundant
counties was significantly less educated than in the other counties in 1990.
To what extent can the more rapid transition from agriculture to manufacturing in coun-
ties that are not oil abundant explain their more rapid accumulation of human capital?
Using census data on the diﬀerences in human capital between agriculture, manufacturing,
and services, the eﬀect of the diﬀerential changes in industry composition account for about
1-1.5 percentage points in the fraction of high-school graduates. In other words, diﬀerences
in aggregate industry composition can explain about 20-30 percent of the variation in the
rate of human capital accumulation.21 Since this calculation does not account for persistence
in manufacturing and service industries related to oil, it seems likely that variation at lower
levels of industry aggregation within manufacturing may explain even more of the diﬀerential
changes in education.
In order to examine the channels through which oil-abundance aﬀects human capital
accumulation, I further examine the relationship between oil-abundance and education. Es-
timated coeﬃcients using three diﬀerent specifications as in the top panel of Table 4 and
data for 1990 indicate that the fraction of high-school graduates in oil abundant counties
were about 1.3-3 percentage points and high-school dropout rates for people aged 16-19 were
about 0.8-1.7 percentage points higher. In addition, I use micro data from the 1980 census,
which identify individuals’ county group of residence. Using data for the three oil abundant
states in this region (Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma) and the adjacent states (NewMexico,
Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Mississippi), I find that among people aged 25
20Tables 4 and 5 use the same specifications as Table 2.
21Detailed calculations available from author.
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years or older residents of county groups with at least one oil abundant county are 5.2 per-
centage points less educated. I find a similar coeﬃcient when I run this regression separately
for people who moved into the county in the last 5 years and for people who stayed in the
county over the past 5 years. Although these estimates should be taken with caution22, they
suggest that the slower accumulation of human capital in the oil abundant counties is likely
due to both lower education of people born in these counties, as the model predicts, and to
lower net inflows of educated workers.
The finding that oil-abundance slowed down the rate of human capital accumulation is
interesting in three respects. First, oil has remained a skill-intensive good, throughout the
period I analyze, so the direct eﬀect of demand for skill in the oil-producing industry is
unlikely to give rise to lower level of human capital accumulation. Second, the oil abundant
counties have higher per capita income throughout the period, so we may expect that they
generate higher tax revenues per capita and spend more per capita. In fact, this is indeed the
case: public spending in the oil-abundant counties are higher than in the other counties, and
the diﬀerence corresponds to per capita income diﬀerentials, for both 1970 and 1980 (despite
the large oil shock). Moreover, per capita spending on education is correspondingly higher
in oil-abundant counties. Yet despite these higher investments, the oil abundant counties
accumulated less human capital, consistent with the hypothesis that oil-abundance aﬀects
demand for skill. Finally, although the reversal in skill endowments is consistent with the
predictions of the model outlined in this paper, it diﬀers from the predictions of standard
convergence models with factor accumulation. Indeed this example is reminiscent of larger
scale reversals that have characterized the geographic distribution of economic activity over
time (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002).
Having found that oil abundant counties accumulate more human capital, we can examine
the last prediction of the model, that the specialized oil-producing counties grow at a slower
22The estimates using the 1990 cross-section of counties are not robust to controlling for state fixed eﬀects,
while the estimates using the 1980 county groups are robust to those controls. However, in both cases I have
no panel dimension, so the identification is only from a cross-section.
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rate.
4.4 Specialization and Income
This section tests the eﬀect of specialization in production of oil on income. Table 5 shows
that in 1949 the median family income was about 30 percentage points higher in the oil
abundant counties. The results using data on per capita income, which are available since
1959, are very similar. Moreover, if income from the oil industry is more likely to accrue to
people who reside outside the oil abundant counties than other types of income, then these
results provide a lower bound for the eﬀect of oil on income.
Table 5 also shows that by 1989 the gap in per capita income and median family income
in favor of the oil abundant counties had narrowed to about 5-6 percentage points. Note
that the gap had narrowed in every decade except the 1970s, when the price of oil increased
steeply. Since I have no income data before 1949, Figure 6 compares the estimated eﬀect
of oil-abundance on income to its estimated eﬀect on average manufacturing wages in 1890,
1920, and 1954. To allow for consistent comparisons over time despite limited availability of
historical data, Figure 6 shows the results for a fixed subsample of 451 counties. This Figure
shows that average manufacturing wages rose from about 2 percent (not significant) in 1890
to over 9 percent in 1954. This is still lower than the diﬀerence in income per capita and
median family income during the late 1940s and 1950s, suggesting that some of the diﬀerence
in income is due to diﬀerences in industry composition between oil abundant counties and
control counties. Figure 6 also shows how the discovery of oil led to a divergence in income
relative to the control counties, and how income subsequently converged.
Although I cannot rule out this convergence during the second half of the 20th century
is due to factors such as reduced costs of trade, the results in previous sections suggest
that at least some of the convergence is due to the eﬀect of specialization on the rate of
sectoral change and human capital accumulation. A direct test supports the hypotheses
that convergence was due in part to the eﬀects of oil-abundance: median family income in
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the oil abundant counties grew more slowly from 1949-1989 even after we account for initial
diﬀerences in income.23
Another interesting aspect of oil abundance is its eﬀect on the distribution of income.
The model makes no clear prediction in this regard, but some of the work on the "resource
curse" suggests that oil abundance may lead to a more unequal distribution of income. But
the similar eﬀects of oil-abundance on both the levels and the changes of per capita income
(Table 5) indicate that oil-abundance may have little eﬀect on the distribution of income.
This result is further reinforced in Figure 7, which shows that in 1989 the distribution of
family income in the oil abundant counties significantly dominates the income distribution
of the control counties across the diﬀerent levels of the income distribution.24
Given this evidence that the oil abundant counties enjoyed higher levels oﬀ income for
many decades, we can expect an endogenous response of migration flows towards those
counties. Patterns of population change (Appendix Table A1) suggest that net migration to
the oil abundant counties was larger during the earlier decades, when income diﬀerentials
were large. As income per capita diﬀerentials decreased, net migration to oil abundant
counties appears to have slowed down considerably.25 Michaels and Redding (2006) discuss
in detail the eﬀects of oil-abundance on migration and on the growth rates of cities that of
diﬀerent sizes.
Having established the eﬀects of oil abundance on industry structure, education, and
income, I now examine the robustness of these results to a variety of diﬀerent specifications.
23Regressing ln(median family income in 1989) on a dummy for oil abundance and controlling for ln
(median family income in 1949) using the samples as in specifications (1)-(3) in Table 5 gives coeﬃcients of
about -.02 to -.05, which are statisitcally significant in specifications (2) and (3). This suggests that changes
in income are not driven only by mean reversion.
24Results using the 1949 data, for which we only observe two points in the distribution of median family
income, are also consistent with the hypothesis that the income distribution in the oil-abundant counties
first-order dominates that of the control counties.
25It is diﬃcult to construct consistent panel data on housing prices. Available data suggest that on average,
the median rental rate in oil-abundant counties was about 6 percent higher in 1990 (this estimate is highly
significant). This suggests that conjestion may have had an oﬀsetting eﬀect on population migration.
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4.5 Additional Specification Checks
The results presented thus far indicate that oil-abundance led to specialization in oil pro-
duction, which raised income, and that the control counties gradually caught up with the
oil abundant counties over time. In this section, I examine the robustness of these findings
to the addition of time-varying controls. I also introduce an orthogonal source of variation
that aﬀects specialization in oil, by using variations in the magnitude of the oil endowment
among the oil abundant counties.
One concern with using geological variation in oil-abundance is that it may be correlated
with other geographic factors that aﬀect economic activity. For example, oil (like gas and
coal) is formed from the preserved remains of prehistoric marine plants or animals, which
have been settled to the sea bottom. Despite movements of tectonic plates over many millions
of years and changes in the sea level, oil seems to be found closer to existing oceans.
The first specification in Appendix Tables A2-A5 is the same as the first specification
in Tables 2-5, except that I add controls for time-varying eﬀects of distance to the ocean
and to the nearest navigable river. These interactions appear to have little impact on the
magnitude and precision of most estimates. The only exception is in Table A3, where adding
controls weakens the diﬀerential eﬀect of right-to-work laws on oil abundant counties. This
caveat notwithstanding, the results on the main eﬀect of oil-abundance in the other tables
are quite robust.
Another concern is that oil-abundance may be spuriously correlated with other factors
that change over time. The second column in the Appendix Tables also controls for the
percentage of non-white population, which may be correlated with changes in education and
income. This specification also controls for time interactions of 1940 variation in average
farm size, since land inequality may aﬀect endogenous investments in human capital (Galor,
Moav, and Vollrath 2005). Note that both the distribution of land in 1940 and the percent
of nonwhites may be endogenous to oil abundance, so in this specification I may be over
controlling for endogenous outcomes. However, the results show that adding these controls
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has little eﬀect on the magnitude or the precision of the estimates.26
Finally, we might be concerned that time varying state-level policies may be spuriously
correlated with the location of oil, possibly due to political economy channels. Thus, the
second specification in Tables A2-A5 controls for state-year interactions. Even after adding
these controlling, the eﬀects of oil-abundance on industry composition, education, and in-
come around the middle of the 20th century remain similar, though somewhat smaller. The
eﬀect of oil-abundance on changes over time is smaller than before, though it is still sta-
tistically significant. Note that in this specification, variations in the employment share of
mining is somewhat smaller and diminishes over time, so the smaller eﬀect on other outcomes
is consistent with our expectations.
Whereas all the regressions discussed thus far rely on the distinction between oil abundant
and oil-scarce counties, I also explore the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the size of the oil endowment
among the oil abundant counties on the economic outcomes of interest. One advantage of
this of this approach is that it uses a source of variation that is by construction orthogonal
to the previous source of variation, since we only consider the oil abundant counties. This
serves as a strong robustness check on the estimates presented before. The main drawback
of this approach is that I analyze only 171 counties, or about 22 percent of the previous
sample.
The results using the subsample of oil abundant counties are generally consistent with
my previous findings. Counties that are more oil abundant had a larger employment share
of mining in 1940, a similar employment share of manufacturing, and a considerably smaller
employment share of agriculture. oil abundant counties were also better educated in 1940,
and had higher income per family and per capita in 1949 and 1959.
The bottom panel of Table A6 shows that over time the diﬀerence in the employment
share of mining between the most oil-rich counties and the other oil abundant counties has
narrowed considerably. This suggests that the eﬀects of specialization on changes in outcomes
26Similarly, controlling for median county age, which is available since 1950, has little eﬀect on the results.
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are likely smaller. The next columns indicate that over time oil production diﬀerentially
crowded out services, rather than manufacturing. My findings also suggest a smaller and
less precise eﬀect of oil-abundance on education, and a significant and negative eﬀect on
income. The main diﬀerence from the results in the previous tables is that the findings here
do not represent any reversal: in 1990 the oil-rich counties are not worse oﬀ than the counties
with less oil in any of the outcomes I measure. This caveat notwithstanding, the pattern
that emerges from Table A6 is quite consistent with the previous evidence: endowment-
driven specialization in oil production initially improves economic outcomes, but over time
this advantage is eroded as less-specialized economies shift more quickly to new and skill
abundant industries.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the long-term consequences of regional specialization, when it is caused
by natural resource endowment. Using geological variation in the location of subsurface oil
in the Southern US, I find that oil abundant counties were similar to other nearby counties
in 1890, before any major oil discoveries took place. Over the next 50 years, oil abundant
counties became highly specialized in oil-production, and their mining sector became as
large as their entire manufacturing sector. This natural experiment allows me to examine
the eﬀects of regional specialization on a variety of economic outcomes.
My findings suggest that regional specialization has generally had a positive impact on
the local economy. In 1940, when the Southern US was very agricultural, oil production
crowded out agriculture. Since oil production is more skill intensive then agriculture, the oil
abundant counties had a better educated workforce than other counties nearby: the fraction
of high school graduates was about 3 percentage points higher. Importantly, the oil abundant
counties enjoyed per capita income that was about 30 percentage points higher in 1949.
From 1940-1990, the Southern US transitioned from agriculture to manufacturing and
services. I find that this transition was slower in the oil abundant counties, leading to a
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significantly slower process of human capital accumulation, and there is some evidence that
by 1990 the workforce in the oil abundant counties was actually less educated than in the
other counties. Moreover, the income per capita diﬀerential in favor of the oil abundant
counties narrowed to about 5-6 percentage points.
Yet despite the diﬀerent growth path of the oil abundant counties, I find little evidence
that this regional specialization led to negative outcomes. Income distribution in the oil
abundant counties first-order stochastically dominated that of the other counties. Moreover,
diﬀerences in local government expenditures per capita between the oil abundant counties
and the other counties seem to reflect income per capita diﬀerentials, and not an increased
propensity to spend. The only concern about the eﬃciency of the public sector seems to be
a somewhat higher dropout rate in the oil abundant counties, despite significantly higher
investments in education per capita.
These findings suggest a balanced view of the long-term consequences of regional special-
ization in oil production. On the one hand, I find that the specialized counties enjoyed higher
per capita income for a long period of time. This suggests that in an economy with strong
institutions, resources are not necessarily "cursed", consistent with Wright and Czelusta
(2004). Any negative eﬀects of resource abundance, if any, are likely limited to countries
with weaker institutions (e.g. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2002). On the other hand, I find
evidence that even in a developed economy, specialization crowds out the adoption of new
goods and technologies, leading to slower human capital accumulation.
The findings in this paper open a number of interesting avenues for future research. For
example, it seems important to examine the consequences of specialization in goods that
aﬀect the comparative advantage in the production of new goods, and the transition path of
economies that loses it source of comparative advantage.
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Appendix: Uniqueness
This Appendix gives suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness of the open-economy equilib-
rium. First, note that there is a unique solution for P ∗, e∗, and S∗ (using equations 6, 8,
and 10). Second, for S such that (1−B)wLS − Bw∗L∗S∗ = 0, when the home economy
is fully specialized, an increase in S raises the right-hand side of 7. But using 11 and 9 the
left hand side is increasing in S, so S is unique. We can then use 11 and 9 to obtain the
unique values of Ps and e. Finally, holding S constant, z decreases in ω in 4 and increases
in ω in 5, so there is a unique solution in z and ω. This shows that there the solution to the
8 equations is unique at least when the home economy is nearly specialized.
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Oil-abundant
All
Adjacent to oil-
abundant
Not adjacent to 
oil-abundant
Land Area (Square miles, 1940) 988 962 974 954
(561) (828) (771) (869)
Population (1940) 30,493 25,243 24,413 25,865
(49,112) (41,842) (40,850) (42,618)
Population density (1940) 36.1 38.4 38.4 38.3
(50.3) (117.8) (156.0) (78.2)
Percent employed in mining (1940) 6.2 1.3 1.4 1.1
(7.8) (3.4) (3.2) (3.6)
Percent employed in agriculture (1940) 37.5 45.4 44.0 46.4
(18.6) (16.5) (15.8) (17.0)
Perecnt employed in manufacturing (1940) 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.8
(5.7) (5.8) (6.6) (5.2)
Percent of high-school graduates among 25+ year-olds (1940) 21.2 18.7 19.6 18.1
(8.4) (7.4) (7.3) (7.4)
Median family income (1949 US Dollars) 2,403 1,874 2,017 1,770
(806) (764) (732) (772)
Per capita income (1959 US Dollars) 1,415 1,214 1,274 1,169
(394) (380) (365) (385)
Counties 171 604 258 346
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
Non oil-abundant
NOTES. Oil abundant denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 million barrels of oil before 
any oil was extracted. The non oil-abundant counties are all the counties within 200 miles of the oil-abundant counties of Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma that are not 
oil-abundant. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 4.9 5.1 5.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -7.9 -8.9 -8.8
(0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8)
Intercept 1.3 1.1 1.1 5.9 5.8 6.2 45.4 46.4 46.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9)
Observations 774 516 508 774 516 508 770 514 504
Oil-abundant x 1950 2.0 2.4 2.4 -1.2 -1.4 -1.4 -3.0 -4.2 -4.7
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7)
Oil-abundant x 1960 0.8 1.4 1.3 -2.7 -3.6 -4.2 2.5 2.8 2.6
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (1.0) (1.1) (1.1)
Oil-abundant x 1970 0.3 0.7 0.7 -4.6 -6.3 -7.2 5.4 7.0 6.9
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (1.3) (1.5) (1.5)
Oil-abundant x 1980 1.1 2.1 2.2 -3.5 -4.8 -5.6 5.6 6.9 6.8
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -0.6 0.1 0.2 -4.0 -5.5 -6.5 6.0 7.4 7.2
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (1.4) (1.6) (1.6)
1950 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 3.4 3.6 3.6 -6.7 -5.5 -5.3
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
1960 0.5 -0.1 0.0 7.2 8.1 8.3 -22.2 -22.5 -22.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (0.6)
1970 0.3 -0.1 0.0 11.8 13.5 13.8 -30.8 -32.4 -32.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9)
1980 1.3 0.3 0.4 10.9 12.2 12.7 -34.2 -35.5 -35.3
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9)
1990 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 9.5 11.0 11.7 -35.6 -37.0 -36.9
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9)
Observations 4,641 3,097 3,045 4,649 3,101 3,053 4,633 3,093 3,037
Agriculture
Table 2.  Effect of Oil Abundance on Employment, by Sector
A. Cross-Section of Counties (1940)
NOTES. The dependent variable is the percentage of the labor force employed in each sector. "Oil abundant" denotes that 
the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 million barrels of 
oil before any oil was extracted. Specification (1) uses the full sample of counties. Specification (2) excludes counties 
adjacent to the oil abundant counties. Specification (3) includes only oil abundant counties in Texas, Louisiana, and 
Oklahoma, and non oil abundant counties in the other nearby states. Panel regression include county fixed effects and time 
effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel regressions.
Mining Manufacturing
B. Panel of Counties (1940-1990)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant x 1950 -0.7 -1.1 -0.7
(0.5) (0.5) (0.6)
Oil-abundant x 1960 -2.2 -2.8 -2.0
(0.6) (0.7) (0.7)
Oil-abundant x 1970 -2.4 -2.9 -1.3
(0.9) (1.0) (1.1)
Oil-abundant x 1980 -1.0 -1.3 0.4
(1.0) (1.1) (1.2)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -2.2 -2.4 -1.1
(1.0) (1.0) (1.1)
Pro-business x 1950 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.5 -0.7
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8) (0.7)
Pro-business x 1960 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.8 1.9
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6)
Pro-business x 1970 1.7 2.4 3.6 2.4 4.3 5.9
(0.6) (0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0)
Pro-business x 1980 0.7 1.4 2.8 1.4 2.9 4.8
(0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0)
Pro-business x 1990 0.3 1.3 2.7 0.8 2.9 4.7
(0.6) (0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1950 -1.3 -0.7 -0.5
(0.8) (1.0) (1.0)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1960 -0.8 -1.2 -3.1
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1970 -3.2 -5.0 -7.9
(1.0) (1.3) (1.3)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1980 -3.1 -4.6 -7.7
(1.2) (1.4) (1.4)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1990 -2.2 -4.2 -6.9
(1.1) (1.3) (1.3)
Observations 4,649 3,101 3,053 4,649 3,101 3,053
Table 3.  Effect of Oil Abundance and Right-to-Work Laws on Industrialization
NOTES. The dependent variable is the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing. "Oil abundant" denotes 
that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 million 
barrels of oil before any oil was extracted. Specification (1) uses the full sample of counties. Specification (2) excludes 
counties adjacent to the oil abundant counties. Specification (3) includes only oil abundant counties in Texas, Louisiana, 
and Oklahoma, and non oil abundant counties in the other nearby states. Panel regression include county fixed effects 
and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel 
regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 2.5 3.2 2.3
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
Intercept 18.7 18.1 18.7
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
Observations 775 517 509
Oil-abundant x 1950 -1.4 -2.4 -3.3
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Oil-abundant x 1960 -0.6 -0.9 -1.7
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Oil-abundant x 1970 -2.9 -4.2 -5.7
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Oil-abundant x 1980 -4.1 -5.8 -6.9
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -3.7 -5.0 -5.3
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
1950 6.0 6.9 7.5
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
1960 13.4 13.7 14.2
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
1970 22.8 24.2 24.9
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
1980 37.2 38.9 39.2
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
1990 47.7 49.0 48.6
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Observations 4,648 3,101 3,053
Table 4.  Effect of Oil Abundance on the Stock of Educated Workers
NOTES. The dependent variable is the fraction of high-school graduates among people aged 25 and over. "Oil abundant" 
denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 
million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted. Specification (1) uses the full sample of counties. Specification (2) 
excludes counties adjacent to the oil abundant counties. Specification (3) includes only oil abundant counties in Texas, 
Louisiana, and Oklahoma, and non oil abundant counties in the other nearby states. Panel regression include county fixed 
effects and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel 
regressions.
A. Cross-Section of Counties (1940)
B. Panel of Counties (1940-1990)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 0.27 0.34 0.35 0.17 0.21 0.21
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 759 510 502 774 517 509
Oil-abundant x 1959 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oil-abundant x 1969 -0.18 -0.23 -0.25 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oil-abundant x 1979 -0.15 -0.19 -0.20 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Oil-abundant x 1989 -0.21 -0.28 -0.29 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1959 0.65 0.69 0.70
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1969 1.27 1.33 1.34 0.60 0.63 0.63
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1979 2.15 2.19 2.20 1.57 1.59 1.58
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1989 2.64 2.71 2.71 2.14 2.17 2.17
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 3,856 2,578 2,538 3,099 2,068 2,036
Table 5.  Effect of Oil Abundance on Income
NOTES. "Oil abundant" denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that 
contained at least 100 million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted. Specification (1) uses the full sample of counties. 
Specification (2) excludes counties adjacent to the oil abundant counties. Specification (3) includes only oil abundant 
counties in Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, and non oil abundant counties in the other nearby states. Panel regression 
include county fixed effects and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by 
county in the panel regressions.
Ln(Median Family Income) Ln(Per Capita Income)
Cross-Section (1949) Cross-Section (1959)
Panel (1949-1989) Panel (1959-1989)
(1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 0.13 0.09 0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 774 516 508
Oil-abundant x 1950 0.11 0.12 0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Oil-abundant x 1960 0.21 0.24 0.21
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Oil-abundant x 1970 0.19 0.21 0.21
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Oil-abundant x 1980 0.23 0.24 0.28
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Oil-abundant x 1990 0.24 0.25 0.30
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
1950 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1960 -0.09 -0.12 -0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1970 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1980 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
1990 0.05 0.04 0.00
(0.29) (0.34) (0.32)
Observations 4,649 3,101 3,053
Table A1.  Effect of Oil Abundance on Ln(Population)
NOTES. "Oil abundant" denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that 
contained at least 100 million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted. Specification (1) uses the full sample of counties. 
Specification (2) excludes counties adjacent to the oil abundant counties. Specification (3) includes only oil abundant 
counties in Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, and non oil abundant counties in the other nearby states. Panel regressions 
include county fixed effects and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by 
county in the panel regressions.
A. Cross-Section of Counties (1940)
B. Panel of Counties (1940-1990)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 5.1 4.9 4.8 -0.8 -0.7 0.4 -9.3 -7.1 -6.4
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Intercept 0.1 1.0 9.2 8.3 51.7 41.1
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (1.3) (1.8)
Observations 774 774 774 774 774 774 770 770 770
Oil-abundant x 1950 1.9 1.9 1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 -1.0
(0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Oil-abundant x 1960 0.6 0.7 0.3 -3.1 -3.0 -1.4 4.8 4.6 2.4
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (1.0) (0.9) (1.0)
Oil-abundant x 1970 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -5.0 -4.8 -2.0 8.1 7.6 3.7
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
Oil-abundant x 1980 0.8 0.8 0.1 -3.4 -3.2 -1.4 8.4 7.1 4.1
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -0.8 -0.8 -1.2 -3.8 -3.4 -1.3 8.5 6.4 3.8
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
1950 0.7 0.7 5.5 5.4 -13.0 -12.4
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5)
1960 1.1 1.2 10.0 9.9 -32.6 -31.9
(0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.9) (0.9)
1970 1.1 1.1 16.4 16.1 -43.6 -41.8
(0.2) (0.2) (0.7) (0.7) (1.1) (1.1)
1980 2.3 2.4 13.4 13.1 -47.0 -45.1
(0.3) (0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (1.2) (1.2)
1990 1.3 1.3 11.2 10.9 -47.7 -46.2
(0.2) (0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (1.2) (1.2)
Observations 4,641 4,636 4,636 4,649 4,644 4,644 4,633 4,628 4,628
Agriculture
Table A2.  Effect of Oil Abundance on Employment, by Sector
A. Cross-Section of Counties (1940)
NOTES. The dependent variable is the percentage of the labor force employed in each sector. Oil abundant denotes that the 
county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 million barrels of oil 
before any oil was extracted. All specifications use the full sample of counties. Specification (1) controls for interactions of 
distance to the nearest navigable river and ocean with year dummies. Specification (2) adds to (1) controls for fraction of non-
white population in county and for year interactions of average farm size in 1940. Specification (3) adds to (2) controls for 
state-year interactions. Panel regressions include county fixed effects and time effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel regressions.
Mining Manufacturing
B. Panel of Counties (1940-1990)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant x 1950 -0.8 -0.7 -1.0
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Oil-abundant x 1960 -3.3 -3.2 -1.6
(0.6) (0.6) (0.7)
Oil-abundant x 1970 -4.9 -4.7 -2.3
(0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
Oil-abundant x 1980 -2.9 -2.7 -1.8
(1.0) (1.0) (1.1)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -3.6 -3.2 -2.9
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0)
Pro-business x 1950 0.6 0.3 4.3 0.7 0.4 4.4
(0.4) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7)
Pro-business x 1960 -0.2 -0.3 9.2 -0.4 -0.4 9.3
(0.3) (0.3) (2.3) (0.4) (0.4) (2.3)
Pro-business x 1970 0.8 0.8 5.8 0.7 0.8 6.0
(0.5) (0.5) (1.4) (0.6) (0.6) (1.4)
Pro-business x 1980 0.2 0.1 16.6 0.3 0.2 16.7
(0.6) (0.6) (6.8) (0.6) (0.6) (6.8)
Pro-business x 1990 0.4 0.3 15.1 0.4 0.3 15.2
(0.6) (0.6) (8.0) (0.6) (0.7) (8.0)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1950 -1.5 -1.5 -0.1
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1960 0.3 0.2 0.4
(0.7) (0.7) (0.8)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1970 -0.2 -0.2 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1980 -0.6 -0.6 0.5
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2)
Oil-abundant x Pro-business x 1990 -0.3 -0.2 1.9
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2)
Observations 4,649 4,644 4,644 4,649 4,644 4,644
Table A3.  Effect of Oil Abundance and Right-to-Work Laws on Industrialization
NOTES. The dependent variable is the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing. "Oil abundant" denotes 
that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 million barrels 
of oil before any oil was extracted. All specifications use the full sample of counties. Specification (1) controls for 
interactions of distance to the nearest navigable river and ocean with year dummies. Specification (2) adds to (1) controls for 
fraction of non-white population in county and for year interactions of average farm size in 1940. Specification (3) adds to 
(2) controls for state-year interactions. Panel regressions include county fixed effects and time effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 4.3 3.7 2.5
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Intercept 11.7 14.7
(0.4) (0.6)
Observations 774 774 774
Oil-abundant x 1950 -0.3 -0.2 0.3
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Oil-abundant x 1960 0.1 0.2 -0.1
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Oil-abundant x 1970 -1.7 -1.3 -0.4
(0.6) (0.6) (0.5)
Oil-abundant x 1980 -3.1 -2.3 -1.5
(0.7) (0.6) (0.6)
Oil-abundant x 1990 -3.4 -1.8 -2.0
(0.7) (0.6) (0.6)
1950 2.2 1.8
(0.3) (0.3)
1960 10.4 9.7
(0.3) (0.3)
1970 18.8 17.4
(0.5) (0.5)
1980 34.2 32.7
(0.5) (0.5)
1990 46.8 45.7
(0.5) (0.5)
Observations 4,648 4,643 4,643
Table A4.  Effect of Oil Abundance on the Stock of Educated Workers
NOTES. The dependent variable is the fraction of high-school graduates among people aged 25 and over. "Oil abundant" 
denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that contained at least 100 
million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted.  All specifications use the full sample of counties. Specification (1) 
controls for interactions of distance to the nearest navigable river and ocean with year dummies. Specification (2) adds to (1) 
controls for fraction of non-white population in county and for year interactions of average farm size in 1940. Specification 
(3) adds to (2) controls for state-year interactions. Panel regressions include county fixed effects and time effects. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel regressions.
A. Cross-Section of Counties (1940)
B. Panel of Counties (1940-1990)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Oil-abundant 0.35 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 759 758 758 774 773 773
Oil-abundant x 1959 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oil-abundant x 1969 -0.22 -0.19 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oil-abundant x 1979 -0.21 -0.16 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oil-abundant x 1989 -0.26 -0.19 -0.10 -0.17 -0.12 -0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
1959 0.74 0.73
(0.01) (0.01)
1969 1.48 1.43 0.70 0.68
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
1979 2.43 2.39 1.75 1.72
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
1989 2.90 2.86 2.31 2.30
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 3,856 3,851 3,851 3,099 3,095 3,095
Table 5.  Effect of Oil Abundance on Income
NOTES. "Oil abundant" denotes that the county was located above at least part of an oil field (or multiple oil fields) that 
contained at least 100 million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted.  All specifications use the full sample of counties. 
Specification (1) controls for interactions of distance to the nearest navigable river and ocean with year dummies. 
Specification (2) adds to (1) controls for fraction of non-white population in county and for year interactions of average farm 
size in 1940. Specification (3) adds to (2) controls for state-year interactions. Panel regressions include county fixed effects 
and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by county in the panel regressions.
Ln(Median Family Income) Ln(Per Capita Income)
Cross-Section (1949) Cross-Section (1959)
Panel (1949-1989) Panel (1959-1989)
Mining Manufacturing Agriculture
Ln(oil endowment) 3.68 0.72 -7.29 2.75 0.17 0.14
(0.61) (0.30) (1.13) (0.55) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 171 171 171 171 166 171
Ln(oil endowment) x (end year) -1.75 -0.60 5.96 -0.62 -0.10 -0.08
(0.46) (0.39) (1.07) (0.73) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 342 342 342 342 337 342
Table A6.  Effect of Variations in Oil Abundance
NOTES. The sample is restricted to oil-abundant counties, as explained in previous tables. "Oil endowment" measures the total number of barrels in oil fields that had at 
least 100 million barrels and lie beneath each county. When multiple counties lie above a single oil field, I assume that the quantity of oil in that field is shared equally 
between the counties. For brevity, the sample in each of the panel regressions includes only the base year and the end year. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the effect on 
industry composition of employment; column (4) measures the effect on the fraction of people aged 25 and over that have at least completed high school; and columns 
(5) and (6) examine the effect on income. In columns (1)-(4) the base year is 1940 and the end year is 1990. In column (5) the base year is 1949 and the end year is 1989. 
In column (6) the base year is 1959 and the end year is 1989. Panel regressions include county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are 
clustered by county in the panel regressions.
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Figure 2. Number of new major US oilfields discovered, by decade
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Figure 4. Employment as percentage of labor force in oil-abundant and control counties: 1940-1990
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Figure 5. Percent with high school education or more, among people aged 25+: 1940-1990
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Figure 6. Differences in ln(income) between oil-abundant and control counties: 1890-1989
Based on separate regressions for a fixed subsample of 451 counties. Blank circles: statistically insignificant estimates
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Figure 7. Percent of families below different income levels (1989)
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